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Abstract  
With the boom in the Chinese economy and its increasing influence in the global world order, China 
adhered to a new strategy that focuses on improving its image in the world by relying solely on soft 
power. China’s soft power strategy in the Middle East is little researched, however, the Middle East is 
of paramount global importance as the region is the world’s largest energy supplier. This thesis examines 
China’s soft power strategy and its key objectives in the Middle East through an in-depth analysis 
focusing on economic, cultural, political and military soft power initiatives. The findings of this research 
argue that China’s pivot towards the Middle East is primarily driven by its need to secure energy sources, 
as well as other economic interests. Its influence in the Middle East is rapidly increasing through these 
various soft power initiatives. Although China’s soft power strategy is mainly focused on economic and 
cultural soft power initiatives, political and military soft power initiatives have taken a larger focus in 
recent years. As China is gradually shifting from non-interference to limited-interference in the regions 
political and security affairs, it is committed to maintain and improve its image, which it attained solely 
through soft power, by not losing its neutrality while gradually becoming more proactive in the political 
and security field.  
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Introduction 
With the end of the Cold War, the world shifted into a unipolar power system. The dissolution of the 
Soviet Union preluded to a new era in which America’s extensive diplomatic influence and military 
strength contributed to the new widespread perception of an America-centric world order, particularly 
in the 1990s. The United States (U.S.) transformed the global economy into a capitalist system by 
adopting a neoliberal economic policy that promoted elements such as free trade and open markets. 
Initially, mainly North American and Western European states benefited from this capitalistic system. 
Yet, with the turn of the century, this situation has changed as new players across the world have been 
shifting towards the center of the world order, thereby gradually influencing a shift in the global balance 
of power. At the same time, America’s influence has declined as a result of what some scholars call 
“imperial overstretch”, meaning that the great power’s global commitments have become too expensive 
to sustain (Fox, 2016). Especially China is considered to increasingly pose a challenge to America’s 
global influence (Regilme & Parisot, 2017).  
When in 1976 the Mao regime came to an end, China had the opportunity to redefine its national 
objectives. It adopted an economic strategy which resulted in the opening-up of the economy. As 
China’s economy integrated into the global capitalist system, the country succeeded to transform into a 
major global trade and economic power with its economy growing at an average annual Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) growth rate of ten percent. As a result of this high growth rate, China is now the world’s 
second largest economy. Moreover, China is the leading state in foreign investments, the world’s largest 
exporter and second-largest importer of merchandise goods (Petras, 2012). With a population of almost 
1.4 billion people, this economic transformation raised some 800 million people out of poverty (Eckart, 
2016). As former president Hu Jintao stated in the yearly speech at the National Congress of the 
Communist Party of China: “China's development has not only enabled its people to move steadily 
toward prosperity and happiness, but also contributed substantially to the growth of the world economy 
and the progress of human civilization.” (2007). 
The unprecedented rise of China that further diffuses the shape of global power, was creating concerns 
and suspicion amongst other governments (Wang & Lu, 2008, p. 435). As the Chinese leadership 
realized that China was no longer an emerging state but was rising to become a global power, it began 
to adopt a soft power strategy in 2007. Not only was soft power used to show the world its commitment 
to a ‘peaceful rise and thus to counter the prevailing discourse amongst other states, it was also linked 
to the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation as a great power (Economy, 2016). The concept of soft power 
was initiated by Joseph S. Nye in the 1990s. He stated that soft power is the ability to shape someone’s 
preferences through ‘attraction’, rather than ‘coercion’, which is the case with hard power. Other 
academics have ever since increasingly researched the notion of soft power. The variety of ‘attractive 
sources’ for soft power particularly have been the subject for scholarly discussions as the notion of 
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‘attraction’ is subjective and hence has led to the expansion of the definition of soft power. In the Chinese 
context, soft power has developed into a more inclusive form of power through attraction. By countering 
the Western, particularly the American, notion of soft power influence through the implementation of 
self-defined Chinese conception of soft power, China has tried to attract adoration and admiration in a 
different manner (Economy, 2016).  
China has increasingly expanded its involvement in the Middle East since the 1990s.1 Its engagement in 
the region has predominantly been economic, particularly focused on securing energy sources. 
Nonetheless, China is increasingly being approached by Middle Eastern states for trade, construction, 
investments, diplomatic consultations and even security operations (Scobell & Nader, 2016, p. 5). By 
establishing close ties with all states in the Middle East, China is expanding its interests and deepening 
its presence in the region. As China is deepening its involvement in the region, it tries to maintain its 
political neutrality towards regional conflicts and controversies, particularly by adhering to solely soft 
power tools. China’s flexible and pragmatic strategy enables it to become increasingly active on the 
diplomatic front, establishing different platforms for increased cooperation, such as the “One Belt, One 
Road” initiative (OBOR).  
The majority of the conducted research on China’s global outreach through its soft power strategy has 
predominantly focused on Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America. However, there is a lack of 
conducted research that focusses on Chinese soft power in the Middle East. Yet, the Middle East is of 
paramount international importance as it is the world’s largest energy supplier. Moreover, the Middle 
East is the world’s most volatile region, which automatically means that due to this global reliance on 
the region’s energy sources, any tumult in the region affects the rest of the world. In the light of the 
transforming world order, it is crucial to understand how regional dynamics are changing as new players 
are entering the stage, in this case, China in the Middle East, one of the most important regions in the 
world. Moreover, analyzing China’s sole commitment to soft power in the Middle East will provide us 
with a perspective on how untraditional great power foreign policy is deepening China’s relations with 
the Middle East. Therefore, this thesis sheds light on China’s influence in the Middle East and aims to 
answer the following questions: 
What are the key objectives for China’s foreign policy in the Middle East? How is China using a soft 
power strategy to gain influence in the Middle East? 
The purpose of this Master’s thesis is to gain insight into China’s soft power strategy in the Middle East. 
In order to gain a clear understanding of the different elements of China’s soft power strategy, a holistic 
definition of soft power will be used including economic, cultural, political, and military soft power. 
                                                          
1 The definition of the Middle East is not static. In this particular thesis, the Middle East constitutes of Bahrain, 
Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, The Palestinian Territories, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
Syria, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. In addition, Afghanistan and South-Sudan are added to the definition 
in order to demonstrate China’s increasingly active role in the political arena (chapter six).  
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This thesis argues that China’s interest in the Middle East is mainly shaped by its need for continuous 
energy supply and economic and trade-related considerations. Moreover, China is increasingly 
deploying its economic and cultural soft power initiatives which enhance its trade relations and cultural 
exchange with the region. Although China is also deepening its relation regarding political cooperation 
and soft military contribution, which indicates a more pro-active stance, China’s focus on its geo-
economic interests restrains China from getting too involved in regional affairs.  
This thesis is divided in a theoretical and an empirical part. The first chapter deals with the theoretical 
background on soft power. It includes a definition of power, academic discussions on the definition of 
soft power, and describes how China has deployed its global soft power strategy. The second chapter 
lays out the methodological approach of this thesis, which is inherently descriptive and explorative. In 
chapter three, the empirical part of the thesis is initiated. This chapter provides insight into China’s rise, 
the adoption of the soft power strategy, and its recently enhanced relation with the Middle East. 
Subsequently, in chapter four, the first key element of soft power, namely economic soft power will be 
analyzed with regards to the Middle East. Their economic ties are mainly focused on energy, 
infrastructure, manufacturing goods, and the OBOR initiative. The second key element; cultural soft 
power, will be analyzed in chapter five, exploring educational outreach, the spread of Chinese media, 
and the promotion of arts. The sixth chapter analyzes the third key element of political soft power, 
focusing on China’s gradual shift in the political arena of the Middle East. In the seventh chapter, the 
last key element of soft power, namely China’s soft military power is being analyzed. This is followed 
by chapter eight, which will deal with the opportunities and challenges of future Chinese presence in the 
Middle East. Finally, with the outcome of the analyses of the elements, this thesis provides an answer 
to the research questions in a final conclusion. 
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1 Background 
1.1 What is power? 
“Power is like the weather. Everyone depends on it and talks about it, but few understand it.” (Nye , 
2004, p. 1) 
Power. Although everyone recognizes the existence of power, the concept is ambiguous and hard to 
define. The simplest understanding of power is the capability of accomplishing something. Yet, this 
definition fails to provide any information about context or relationship. One of the most known 
definition on power has been Robert Dahl’s definition: “A has power over B to the extent that he can 
get B to do something that B would not otherwise do.” (Dahl, 1957, p. 203). Thus, the definition of 
power contains a relationship between an agent, A, and a subject of power, B. This relationship is bound 
to be different since it depends on specific contexts. As Joseph Samuel Nye Jr states, it is not possible 
to speak about power without specifying who is involved in the power relationship nor without 
specifying what topics are involved (Nye, 2011, p. 6) 
Power is often defined in relation to the possession of resources as a shortcut to analyze other states’ 
power. However, successful conversion of resources into power requires skillful leadership and well-
designed strategies in order for actors to realize the potential of their resources (Nye, 2011, pp. 8-9). 
Therefore, it is rather through behavior that powerful actors can obtain the ability to alter the outcomes 
of their preference. The ability to alter the outcome, instead of the amount of resources, indicates “real” 
power (Nye, 2011, pp. 10-11). According to Nye, behavior can be altered with the help of three means; 
coercion, inducement, and attraction. He makes the distinction between hard and soft power by 
analyzing the nature of the behavior and the tangibility of the resources. Hard power is when the ability 
to change others’ actions is commanded by either the use of coercion or inducement. Others are therefore 
forced to alter their actions since hard power commands them to do so with threatening to use military 
force or economic sanctions. Soft power, however, is trying to obtain certain outcomes with the help of 
attraction (Nye, 2004, p. 5).  
1.2 What is soft power? 
“It may be better for a prince to be feared than to be loved, but the prince is in greatest danger when 
he is hated” - Machiavelli (Nye, 2011, p. 82) 
The ideas that constitute soft power are not new. Several great thinkers have contributed with their 
notions to the concept of soft power as it is known today. Almost a century ago, Antonio Gramsci stated 
that not the military power, nor the force to control the political and economic arena are the most 
effective tool to control a state, but ideology and culture. In addition, Hans J. Morgenthau, the founder 
of the realist school of thought within the field of International Relations, has acknowledged that national 
power consists of visible and invisible power. According to Morgenthau, invisible power, consisting of 
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a state’s national character, national morale, and the quality of its international policy is as important as 
visible power (Li & Hong, 2012, p. 49). Joseph S. Nye initially introduced the concept of soft power in 
the 1990s. He later extended and improved his soft power theory.  
According to Nye, desired outcomes can be obtained without using tangible threats or payoffs. By using 
soft power, others are persuaded to reshape their behavior according to your preferences. This is being 
done without any form of threat or exchange as would have been the case with hard command power. 
On the contrary, soft power relies on attraction. The resources for soft power tend to be associated with 
the co-optive end of the spectrum of behavior (see figure 1) (Nye, 2004, pp. 5-10). A state’s ability to 
successfully exercise soft power depends on the attractiveness of three main assets; its culture, its 
political values, and its foreign policy (Nye, 2011, p. 84). A state’s culture becomes attractive to others 
when it includes and promotes common values and interests. Likewise, a state can have more soft power 
when its national politics are attractive to other states, for instance by being a strong democracy. 
Furthermore, a state’s behavior in the international arena, either regarding its foreign policy or its 
behavior within international institutions, does strongly affect the attractiveness of the state. (Nye, 2004, 
pp. 11-15) 
 Figure 1: Power (Nye, 2004, p. 8) 
1.3 Other perspectives 
A large body of scholars has criticized Nye’s theoretical framework of soft power. They question why 
particularly culture, ideology, and values are the core sources of soft power. Nye assumes that “these 
sources of power are inherently attractive, persuasive, and appealing in nature” (Li M. , 2009, p. 4). 
However, basing soft power on these sources could be problematic. It could, for instance have a counter-
effective effect, as is the case with for instance American popular culture in certain parts of the world, 
where it contributes to anti-Americanism rather than results in soft power (Katzenstein & Keohane, 
2007). Todd H. Hall argues that in order to consider soft power attractive power, it should be 
acknowledged that attractiveness is based upon subjectively generated standards (Hall, 2016). The 
Beijing Consensus, the Chinese economic model that combines political authoritarianism with economic 
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liberalism, is appealing to many developing states. Yet, many Western developed states find that the 
Beijing consensus is having a negative impact on their bilateral relations with China (Li M. , 2009, p. 
6)’. 
Thus, attractiveness is dependent on the extent X appeals to another’s taste. Other scholars have 
criticized Nye’s soft power as a too Western-focused theory. As the shape of global order is shifting, 
non-Western states’ foreign policies are considered attractive based on other sources, which are not 
included in Nye’s limited conceptualization, such as the amount of foreign investment. Joshua 
Kurlantzick argues that soft power has changed over time and that the definition of soft power should 
be broadened by including all elements outside of the security realm, particularly focusing on economic 
soft power, since this enhances states’ attractiveness (Kurlantzick, 2007, p. 6). Moreover, Li argues that 
the distinction between soft and hard power is not as absolute as Nye states. Traditional sources for hard 
power could be used to exercise soft power. International peacekeeping and deploying the military for 
humanitarian purposes are for instance considered soft military power. The social context is therefore 
crucial in deciding whether power should be considered hard or soft (Li M. , 2009, p. 6).  
1.4 Chinese soft power 
Soft power theory has gained major popularity amongst Chinese academia and officials. In 1993, soft 
power had been introduced in China in an article by Wang Huning, a member of the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP). Huning stated that, instead of deploying costly and less effective hard power, states could 
attract others by having an admirable culture and ideology. However, the article was not really 
influential, partially caused by the reluctance of conservatives within the CCP to copy strategies of the 
Western World (Courmont, 2013). After the turn of the century, soft power gained momentum in China. 
Between 2000 and 2004, 53 Chinese articles were annually published on soft power. This amount 
accelerated further to an annual average of 314 times between 2005 and 2007 (Lai, 2012, p. 2). The 
process of adopting Nye’s ideas of soft power and applying these ideas to China has resulted in an 
alteration of the theory and consequently resulted into “Chinese soft power” theories with different 
characteristics. Chinese academics adhere to Nye’s definition of soft power as power through attraction, 
but have a wider scope on what elements generate attraction. They agree with Nye that culture, foreign 
policy, and values are major aspects of soft power. However, Chinese academics have another 
understanding of attractive institutions and values, emphasizing China’s economic development model, 
the Beijing consensus, as a prominent feature of soft power. Chinese academics stress that China’s socio-
economic success and its experience with development give opportunity for soft power. Sophisticated 
diplomatic relations and respectable behavior in the international arena are also endorsed to improve a 
nation’s soft power. Moreover, Chinese academics argue that national unity and regime legitimacy are 
key for developing soft power since a government needs to enjoy the support of the population to 
successfully gain international status and influence. Other elements that are considered sources of soft 
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power are science and technology, which can be major sources of comparable advantages (Wang & Lu, 
2008, pp. 427-430). 
Besides the popularity of soft power theory amongst the Chinese academics, Chinese government 
officials have also embraced soft power. On 30 August 2004, during the Tenth Conference of Chinese 
Diplomatic Envoys Stationed Abroad, former president Hu Jintao, stated for the first time in history that 
China’s basic objective should be to combine its own development by enhancing friendships with other 
states and likewise by promoting a peaceful and stable international environment in which China was to 
develop soft power sources that would benefit its international status (Lai, 2012, p. 11). Governmental 
officials were aware that China’s rapid economic development was making the world suspicious and 
concerned (Wang & Lu, 2008, p. 435). Soft power was considered the answer to counter the “threatening 
rise of China” discourse, and to assure the world that China aimed to commit to a “peaceful rise” (Lai, 
2012, p. 2). In 2007, during the Seventeenth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, China 
formally announces to adopt soft power as a political strategy.  In the year that followed, China 
developed many sophisticated tools of influence to slowly improve its global soft power strategy. In 
recent years, soft power has become the main strategy of China’s foreign policy. Soft power is no longer 
considered solely a tool to reach great power status, rather China is using it to internationally cultivate 
a good image, especially in the developing world (Courmont, 2013, pp. 347-350).  
With China investing enormous amounts in initiatives that contribute to its national image building, its 
soft power capacity has grown over the years. China’s soft power strategy has mainly focused on the 
developing world, particularly Southeast Asia, Africa and increasingly Latin-America and the Middle 
East (Courmont, 2013, p. 351). Several studies on China’s soft power strategy, particularly in Southeast 
Asia and Africa, have clarified what tools the Chinese government deploys. These tools closely 
correspond with the ideas of Chinese academics on soft power. China’s tools include a soft discourse, 
cultural diplomacy, economic diplomacy and trade, developmental aid, and non-interference towards 
controversial international issues. Furthermore, China is committed to international peace and security 
by contributing to several peacekeeping missions, as well as providing international aid. Additionally, 
China adheres to “good neighbor” policies, aiming to promote a permanent state of peace and security 
in its wider region, which in turn contribute to a better economic environment (Lai, 2012, pp. 2-3) 
1.5 Conceptualization of soft power 
As analyzed above, the sources of soft power are not static. Soft power is generated through attraction, 
which is objective. The variety of sources are identified through empirical researches on Chinese soft 
power in other geographical locations contributed to the understanding that this thesis should not only 
include the economic and the cultural realms, but also the political and the soft military realms. As this 
thesis is aiming to map out China’s soft power strategy and the manner in which China is using this 
strategy to gain influence in the Middle East, a holistic approach is necessary that connects different 
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elements of soft power strategy. Consequently, this thesis identifies four major sources of Chinese soft 
power: China’s foreign economic policies, China’s culture, China’s neutral political contributions, and 
China soft military missions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 
 
2 Methodology  
In this China-focused Master’s thesis, an in-depth analysis will be made on China’s soft power strategy 
in the case of the Middle East. This thesis aims to investigate China’s increasing influence in the Middle 
East and its key objectives. This will be done by a qualitative literature based research design that 
focuses on four key elements of China’s soft power strategy: economy, culture, politics, and military 
soft power. Within the boundaries of this thesis, these four dimensions could provide a precise, and as 
complete as possible, in-depth analysis on China’s soft power strategy. Previous research on China’s 
soft power strategy in Asia and Africa included these dimensions as well. As qualitative research 
provides a great deal of descriptive detail, it fits within this thesis’ research objective (Bryman, 2012, p. 
401). Power in general, and in particular soft power, is difficult to measure. In other words, quantifying 
soft power is complex. The absence of quantitative data could pose weakness on the outcome of the 
thesis. However, as a qualitative design provides the ability for in-depth descriptions of the current 
condition of Chinese soft power in the Middle East, it is the right method in this research.  
By employing a literature based research method, data will be collected by analyzing a wide variety of 
sources. Firstly, primary sources will be used to identify the Chinese government’s own perspective on 
its soft power strategy and its relation with the region. These primary sources include governmental 
documents, such as the 2016 Arab policy paper, and speeches of Chinese officials, such as the speech 
of former President Hu Jintao in 2004. In addition, a wide variety of secondary sources will be used 
during the gathering of data; academic literature, research reports, newspapers, and publications on 
websites of particular institutions, such as the Confucius institute. The sources are selected based on 
their quality and accuracy for this thesis. Furthermore, reliable secondary sources are used by analyzing 
their objectivity by focusing on the absence of personal bias and value-freedom.  
As this research is covering a rich region including seventeen Middle Eastern states in this particular 
case, it is necessary to acknowledge some limitations of this research. Although most states share the 
same language and religion, the states are not homogeneous. In fact, they have different historical, 
political, social and economic backgrounds. It should be clear that this thesis does not aim to examine 
each state individually, rather it tries to describe the current situation in the context of the Middle East 
from a regional perspective. Researching China in the Middle East is a relatively little-researched field. 
Therefore, this research will be primarily explorative and descriptive. 
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3 China-Middle East relation  
The historical origins of the relationship between China and the Middle East date back to ancient times, 
when they were connected by trade networks which are now known as the Ancient Silk Roads. Before 
the 1980s, China’s diplomatic ties with the region were primarily motivated by its communist ideology. 
Yet, with the opening up of China to the rest of the world, China’s interests in the Middle East are 
renewed.  
3.1 China’s rise 
The end of the Mao regime in 1976 gave China the opportunity to redefine its objectives. This resulted 
in an enormous shift of its economic policy. From 1979 onwards, China opened up to large-scale foreign 
trade and investments and likewise implemented free market reforms. Thousands of governmental 
industries were privatized and public subsidies were increasingly being used to promote capitalist 
development. By providing cheap labor, which China abundantly possesses, China gained access to the 
technical know-how of foreign firms, which it later used in the country’s own build-up. The housing for 
the low-wage urban factory workers was being subsidized by the government, providing the chance for 
massive growth as lots of labor power moved to the cities. In order for China to develop its infrastructure, 
funds were provided for the construction of modern infrastructure (Petras, 2012). The economic 
capitalist strategy that had been adopted by the communist government resulted in an “economic 
miracle”. With an average annual growth of the real GDP of almost ten percent between 1989 and 2016, 
China developed into a major global trade and economic power (Trading Economics). In 2010, China 
overtook Japan as the world’s second-largest economy, by having an economic output of 1.33 trillion 
dollars. As China continues to grow at the same pace as it has done in the last three decennia, it is 
expected to become the world’s largest economy between 2025 and 2035. China’s ambitious geo-
economic strategy does not only means economic growth, but also includes active global diplomacy and 
the maintenance and promotion of a stable international arena (Olimat, 2010, p. 308) 
3.2 China’s interest in the Middle East 
China aims to sustain economic development to continuously improve the living standards of the 
Chinese people in order to maintain national stability. Therefore, China has continuously adapted and 
developed its foreign economic policy; its geo-economic strategy. Geo-economics is “the use of 
economic instruments to promote and defend national interests, and to produce beneficial geopolitical 
results.” (Ferchen, 2016, p. 5). In 2001, China adopted the Zou Chuqu, the “going-out” strategy. This 
strategy initiated an outward look for Beijing, trying to discover new markets for its exports, as well as 
finding new energy suppliers. China has particularly been active in Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin-
America, but the Middle East has also increasingly drawn Chinese attention, mainly because of the 
Middle Eastern characteristics (Chen, 2011, p. 1). 
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One of China’s main obstacles has been energy security. The continuously growing economy has 
required increasing amounts of oil. China’s foremost interest in the Middle East is securing access to 
energy sources (Alterman, 2017, p. 6). The Middle East developing markets, which have the potential 
to become a major trade hub that links three continents, draws China’s attention. The region is also very 
likely to remain a significant location for Chinese contractors to undertake major infrastructure projects 
(Kāzemi & Chen, 2014, p. 41). The strategically well located Middle East is playing an important role 
in China’s new “One Belt, One Road” initiative, the plan to rebuild the ancient silk roads, which will 
connect China, through Eurasia, and the Middle East all the way to Europe. Because the Middle East is 
playing such a prominent link in the OBOR initiative, China is interested in transforming the region in 
a stable conflict-free region, as conflict could be a pitfall for a successful completion of the initiative. 
Additionally, China fears that as a consequence of the regional conflicts radical Sunni Jihadi ideology 
spreads among its own Muslim population; the Uighurs and Han Muslims. Preserving security in 
China’s wider neighborhood, including the Middle East, is therefore a key interest. The Middle East is 
also key to China’s desire to develop stronger relationships with regional power and to expand its 
geostrategic beyond its immediate Asia-Pacific neighborhood. Increasing involvement in the region will 
contribute to China’s goal to obtain respect from its citizens, the regional states, and the rest of the world. 
Moreover, it will enhance China’s status as a great power (Scobell & Nader, 2016, pp. 8-19). Another 
major interest of China in the Middle East is its arms trade and military cooperation with regional states. 
As most Western countries are hesitant in trading high-tech military sales to China, Israel has grown to 
be China’s second largest advanced weapons supplier. As Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has 
stated in a meeting with the Chinese "Israeli know-how is more valuable than Arab oil." (Zhu, 2010, p. 
59). Besides being a recipient of Israel’s high-tech weapons, China is also one of the main weapon 
suppliers to several states in the Middle East (Zhu, 2010, pp. 59-62). 
As China is increasingly present in the region, the Middle Eastern states have increased their interest. In 
comparison to the Western states, in particularly the U.S., China adds no political strings, nor specific 
conditions to cooperation. Where the U.S. was hesitant to sell armed drones to the UAE, China was glad 
to offer Chinese produced Wing Loong drones. Likewise, Saudi Arabia increasingly is turning to the 
Chinese weapon market as tensions with the U.S rise (The New Arab, 2016). Likewise, the Chinese 
development model, which includes economic growth without the need for political reforms, appeals to 
several Middle Eastern governments. China is a welcomed actor in the region. The Middle Eastern states 
are aware of the economic benefits a good relationship with China will provide them. As China’s 
influence increases, not only in the region, but certainly also in the world, the regional states perceive 
China as a new power that could counterweight the traditional American influence in the region 
(Alterman, 2017, p. 13). 
 
12 
 
3.3 Platforms for increased cooperation  
3.3.1 The China-Arab States Cooperation Forum  
The Middle Eastern States reacted positively to China’s increasing presence in the region. Both parties 
expressed the desire to create a platform to improve mutual cooperation in which they both would 
benefit. In 2004, the former Chinese president Hu Jintao paid a state visit to Egypt to discuss the 
establishment of the so-called “China-Arab States Cooperation Forum” (CACF) with Amr Moussa, 
Arab League Secretary-General, and representatives of the member states. With the combination of 
“going out” and “bringing in” approaches, the Forum improves China’s own status through soft power 
initiatives by offering mutual benefits and development, and fostering friendships without forming 
depending alliances. Although the creation of this multilateral cooperation organization is still very 
recent, the efforts have resulted in a progressive ‘win-win cooperation’ between the Arab States and 
China. The institutional construction has been expanded quickly after the establishment. Under the 
Forum’s framework, multiple issue specific sub-communication mechanisms are established dedicated 
to cooperation in the economic, cultural, political, and humanistic field. For instance the ‘Entrepreneurs 
Conferences and Investment Seminar’, which focusses on the solid economic facets of cooperation, 
aimed at tangible benefits to both sides. Another example is the Energy Cooperation Conference to 
encourage entrepreneurs to coordinate, cooperate and have constructive dialogues about energy 
development (Kuangyi, 2014, pp. 27-34).  
3.3.2 The One Belt One Road Initiative 
In the fall of 2013, President Xi Jinping introduced a strategic framework to build a 21st century 
reinvention of the Ancient Silk Roads; the OBOR initiative. By building a trade corridor over land, the 
“Silk Road Economic Belt”, and a trade corridor over sea, the “21st Century Maritime Silk Road”, 
China’s geo-economic “going-out” strategy seeks mutual benefit for all parties involved. “The Belt and 
Road Initiative is a way for win-win cooperation that promotes common development and prosperity 
and a road towards peace and friendship by enhancing mutual understanding and trust, and strengthening 
all-round exchanges.” (National Development and Reform Commission, 2015). The initiative, which 
already features 63 economies, has the potential to transform the international economy. It is estimated 
by Chinese official sources that upon realization the initiative will directly benefit 63 percent of the 
global population and will account for a collective annual gross domestic product of US $2,1 trillion, 
which accounts for almost thirty percent of the world’s wealth (Johnson, 2016).  
 Through the ancient Silk Roads trade network the region had been connected to the Far East for 
thousands of years. As the region connects Asia with Africa and Europe, its geographical location has 
strategic importance for OBOR’s success. Most Middle Eastern governments reacted positively to the 
idea of reviving the ancient Silk Roads. Sixteen Middle Eastern economies are currently integrated into 
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the OBOR initiative. 2 The initiative provides the region with economic growth prospects, as trade and 
investment are set to shift ‘two-ways’. Multiple states, like the Gulf Cooperation Council states, Egypt 
and Iran, are developing their economies by focusing on becoming major maritime trade hubs. The 
OBOR initiative coincides perfectly with the ongoing undertakings. Furthermore, the initiative 
strengthens ongoing structural transformations in the Middle East, for instance by enhanced 
infrastructure construction and industrial capacity building (Grieger, 2016, p. 2)  
Figure 2: the OBOR initiative: Six Economic Corridors Spanning Asia, Europa, and Africa (HKTDC Research, 
2016)  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3.3 China’s Arab policy paper 
Although China has been aiming to enhance its relationship with the Arab states, a clear strategy was 
missing. As a result, the Chinese government issued its first Arab policy paper on January 13, 2016. The 
blueprint reveals China’s long-term commitment to the region and indicates a more proactive policy in 
the region. Although a lot of focus lays on the further deepening of their economic ties, the policy paper 
also mentions China’s commitment to peace and development in the Middle East. Overall, the paper is 
divided into five parts, namely, deepen China-Arab strategic cooperative relations of comprehensive 
cooperation and common development; China’s Arab policy; strengthen China-Arab cooperation in an 
all-around manner; China-Arab States Cooperation Forum and its follow-up actions; relations between 
China and Arab regional organizations (Xinhua News Agency, 2016). 
 
 
                                                          
2 Afghanistan, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
Syria, United Arab Emirate, and Yemen.  
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4 Economic soft power 
China has experienced enormous economic growth since the 1980s; an average annual growth of around 
ten percent. By reaching outwards through economic diplomacy, China is enhancing its global economic 
presence. According to its geo-economic strategy, the government’s main task is developing economic 
ties with other states. With regards to the Middle East, China also relied on this typical “business-first 
approach”. According to China’s official statistics, the total trade volume with the Middle East increased 
by 87 percent to $100 billion from 2005 until 2009. This volume further increased to $222 billion in 
2012 (Kāzemi & Chen, 2014, p. 41). Furthermore, in 2013, China was ranked the second largest trading 
partner of the Middle East, while being the biggest trading partner of ten individual states (Sun & Zoubir, 
2015, p. 904). Two years later, China evolved into the world’s largest exporter to the region (Hindy, 
2017).  
In order to facilitate further economic expansion, the Chinese government continuously seeks to improve 
its relation with the region. With the creation of several platforms for the enhancement of cooperation, 
like the CASCF, as well as including the region in the OBOR initiative, China’s tries to emphasize the 
growing economic ties as “win-win” relations (Sun & Zoubir, 2015, pp. 907-910). The economic ties 
have been built on three main pillars: energy, infrastructure, and manufactured goods. In 2014, President 
Xi Jinping introduced the “1+2+3” formula, which prioritizes energy cooperation, but also emphasizes 
the importance of deepening trade and investment, as well as enhancing cooperation in new sectors, 
such as renewable and nuclear energy and aerospace technology (Ministry of Foreign Affairs , 2016).  
4.1 Energy 
As the Chinese economy has continuously been growing, the demand for energy has also increased. In 
1993, China became a net oil importer and consequently had to turn outwards to search for new energy 
sources. In 2009, China became the world’s second-largest net importer of crude oil and petroleum 
products. Four years later, in September 2013, China surpassed the United States as the world’s largest 
net importer of petroleum and other liquids like oil. Although the government has made an effort to 
diversify its energy supplies by exploring renewable energy sources, natural gas, and nuclear power, 
China is still very reliant on the rest of the world, particularly the Middle East (EIA, 2015, pp. 1-2). 
Between 2013 and 2014 alone, China saw its oil import increase with nine percent, while its GDP growth 
was moderate (Alterman, 2017, p. 6).  
The Middle East is home to the world’s largest amount of oil reserves. In 2014, 51 percent of the Chinese 
oil imports were from the Middle East, making China’s economy reliant on the Middle East (EIA, 2015, 
p. 10). Ensuring access to the Middle Eastern oil is therefore a vital element of China’s policy. Besides 
the trade in oil, China has initiated direct investments in the Middle Eastern oil industries. Hereby, 
Chinese national oil companies, like China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), started to compete 
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with Western oil companies to attract contracts (Khoudouri, 2014). Most of these service contracts are 
for developing large oil fields. China is, for instance, the largest investor in postwar Iraq, as CNPC 
obtained the right to develop the al-Ahdab oilfield, among several other Iraqi oilfields, for twenty-three 
years (Downs, 2013). Moreover, China is also engaging in joint constructional contracts with domestic 
companies. China’s Sinopec, another national company, worked together with Saudi oil giant Aramco 
to build an oil refinery in the port city of Yanbu, resulting in a 37.5 percent stake in the plant (Zhu, 2010, 
p. 53). China continues to sign mega oil deals, increasing its influence in the region. The oil states are 
welcoming China’s increasing demand with open arms. The new partnerships are providing the states 
with greater independence and political flexibility from for instance the U.S. 
In recent years, the energy industry has increasingly been focused on developing renewable energy 
sources. The region’s oil producing states are looking to diversify their energy supply in order to face 
future challenges and to maintain their leading position in the energy supply market. Moreover, the 
majority of the region’s states contain few hydrocarbons and lack the oil-generated economic prosperity. 
The region’s non-oil dominated states often subsidize the high energy price, resulting in limited 
investments in economically enhancing sectors. As China is among the leading states when it comes to 
research, development and production of renewable energy, particularly solar technology, this know-
how does not only provide new business opportunities, but also a new source of soft power (Cole, 2016, 
p. 60). In the 2016 policy paper, China elaborates on its future goals to strengthen cooperation on 
renewable energy and its aim to jointly build the China-Arab Clear Energy Training Center (Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs , 2016). Besides China’s capacity and capability, it also has the financial possibilities. 
With an investment plan of spending $360 billion on renewable energy globally by 2020, China is taking 
on the leadership role worldwide, which also results in its increasing influence in the Middle East 
(Gruendler, 2017).  
4.2 Infrastructure and other construction 
According to the China Global Investment Tracker, Chinese total investment and contracts in the Middle 
East between 2010 and 2017 account little over $90 billion. Although most investments have been made 
in the construction of energy infrastructure, enormous amounts have been invested in the construction 
of transport and real-estate (AEI).The quick urbanization of Chinese cities due to the booming economy 
has resulted in knowledge and expertise for Chinese construction companies, which are predominantly 
state owned enterprises. This capacity has led to new opportunities in regions where the demand for 
infrastructure is high, like the Middle East. The Middle Eastern population is projected to increase by 
over 40 percent over the next few decades. In order for the region to serve this growing population, it is 
necessary to invest in its existing, as well as new infrastructure (Rice, 2015). The importance of 
infrastructure became clear after the political leaders witnessed the upheavals during the ‘Arab Spring’ 
and the role material deprivation played on the political instability. Quick results, rapidly erected 
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housing and infrastructure at attractive prices, which often are backed by the Beijing government to 
enhance its comparative advantages, made Chinese construction attractive (Alterman, 2017, pp. 6-7). 
Moreover, the economic prosperity certain states have witnessed, have resulted in gigantic construction 
booms. Because of these states, like UAE, Qatar, Oman, and Egypt, the region’s construction market is 
expected to be the fastest growing market in 2017 (BMI Research, 2017B). The construction projects 
range from high-profile projects like the light rail line in Mecca, which was the first cooperation between 
Saudi Arabia and China, an oil pipeline in the UAE with access to the Indian Ocean, and the construction 
of villas on Dubai’s famous Palm Jumeirah, to the construction of a million housing units by 2020 in 
Egypt (Alterman, 2017, p. 7). 
In accordance with the ‘going-out’ strategy that the Beijing government has adopted, the state-owned 
construction companies will continue to be drawn to the high value project opportunities the region’s 
construction market offers. As it is mutually beneficial for both sides, infrastructure will serve to cement 
the ties between the fast growing trade partners. Given the fiscal weakness of certain states, as well as 
the impact of low oil prices on the region’s oil-exporters, China is increasingly investing in projects. 
The financial partnerships open new doors to Chinese companies to gain assets in the infrastructure 
construction, as well as for the state owned construction companies (BMI Research, 2017A). In addition, 
China’s OBOR initiative will enhance larger investment in infrastructure in the Middle East. The 
region’s location is at a crucial spot along the New Silk Roads. New infrastructure like ports, bridges, 
power plants, roads, railroads, and pipelines are needed to make the massive trade network a success. 
China has announced that it will invest one trillion dollars in the OBOR initiative over the next decade. 
With the help of new China-led funding bodies, like the New Silk Road Fund and the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank, the funding for the OBOR initiative is securing long-term development. 
The huge investments in infrastructure do not only provide work for China’s state-owned construction 
companies, it also is a huge source of soft power. Unlike the West, which is hesitant to invest in 
developing economies, China is bolstering the economies of its whole wider region (Cendrowski, 2016). 
4.3 Manufacturing 
Another important element that constitutes the trade between China and the Middle East are 
manufactured goods. Part of the reason why the Chinese economy has grown fast over the last two 
decades is its comparable advantages of using cheap labor to produce low-cost goods. The Middle East 
is a major consumer of these low-cost goods. Par example, Chinese export to Libya increased from $216 
billion in 2003, to $1.3 billion in 2005 and Dubai is home to Dragon Mart, a mall that showcases Chinese 
manufacturers and wholesalers (Alterman, 2009, p.65). Clothing, telephones, and broadcasting 
equipment are amongst the region’s most popular manufactured imports from China (Hindy, 2017).  
Furthermore, China, although relatively little, is increasingly using the Middle East as manufacturing 
location to gain access to other economic markets, which often closed special trading agreements. For 
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example, China has invested lots of money in the Qualifying Industrial Zones of Egypt and Jordan. 
These zones, which house manufacturing firms, are forming a free trade zone with the United States and 
Israel (Azmeh & Nadvi, 2014, p. 1318).  
4.4 Economic soft power 
China’s economic diplomacy has become an important tool in the Chinese foreign policy to generate 
soft power. This explains China’s lacking interest in interfering in regional affairs and its pragmatic 
stance in the volatile region. Par example, aside from China maintaining a tight relation with Saudi 
Arabia, it also does so with Saudi’s regional nemesis Iran. While sanctions refrained other international 
actors from trade with Iran, China has grown into Iran’s biggest trading partner (Hindy, 2017). The 
increased economic presence in the Middle East and their role in the development of the Middle Eastern 
states have significantly contributed to a positive image of China. The soft power China’s generates 
through the increasing relationship has grown over the years. In particularly the OBOR initiative has 
enhanced China’s influence. While between 2005 and 2009 the Middle East’s export to China grew by 
25 percent, the Middle East’s export to the U.S. declined by 45 percent (Chen, 2011, p. 271). The 
expanded Chinese influence which initially started with economic cooperation has created incentives 
for increased cooperation in other fields, such as cultural exchange. Especially OBOR opens the door 
for more long-term structural cooperation.  
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5 Cultural soft power 
As soft power has become the prominent feature of China’s foreign policy, culture has played a major 
aspect in the strategy of China’s outwards imagine projection as a state with rich history and culture. As 
Nye states, an attractive culture will contribute to a positive outward image, which enhances a state to 
be more influential (Nye , 2004). In this regard, China finds itself in a favorable position since its culture 
is amongst the oldest, global reaching, and most recognizable cultures in the world. During the 
Seventeenth National Congress of the Communist Party in 2007, former President Hu Jintao stated that 
“The great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, will definitely be accomplished by the thriving of Chinese 
culture” (Liu Y. , 2011, p. 27). Cultural diffusion was thereby adopted as one of the main approaches 
for national soft power building. With the adoption of a cultural strategy, Beijing seeks to transform the 
Chinese culture into one of the most influential cultures in the world in order to showcase national power 
and support national interest. Different efforts have been made to develop the Chinese global cultural 
industry. One of the focus points has been the political and financial support for major global cultural 
enterprises, by for instance holding film festivals to promote the Chinese film industry and building a 
national media system broadcasting internationally (Liu Y. , 2011, pp. 17,28-30).  
5.1 Educational outreach   
As a product of the cultural strategy, China established its first Confucius institute in Seoul, South Korea 
in 2004. Similar to the British Council, or the Alliance Française, which are institutes that promote the 
British and French culture abroad, China quickly expanded its Confucius institutes which aim to 
promote Chinese language and culture in foreign states. According to a deputy of the National People’s 
Congress, the use of the language will enhance the spread of Chinese culture and therefore China’s 
global influence (Kurlantzick, 2007, p. 68). The number of Confucius institutes spread quickly to over 
500 institutes worldwide, including seventeen institutes in the Middle East and five Confucius 
classrooms, which are Chinese learning ‘classrooms’ within local educational institutes (Confucius 
Institute). The promotion of language has become a prominent asset of cultural soft power diffusion. 
Besides the Confucius institutes, several other initiatives have been taken to increase the use of the 
Chinese language within the Middle East: under the CACF, a memorandum has been signed on co-
publishing and translating books (Kuangyi, 2014, p. 32). Furthermore, a joint training-program for 
Chinese-Arabic Translators is being established for young students from the Arab League states to gain 
knowledge of the Chinese language and governmental affairs. The scholarship is provided by the 
Chinese Scholarship council (CSC), an institution which is affiliated with the Ministry of Education. 
Upon completion of the program, the students are required to work as a link between China and the 
Middle Eastern states (Chinese Scholarship Council, 2016).  
Although non-religious educational exchange between China and the Middle East is a relatively new 
phenomenon, the number of exchanging students is growing. In the quest for soft power, educational 
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cooperation should be winning “the hearts and minds of the younger generation in the Arab world”. 
(Sawahel, 2016). With the help of scholarships offered by the CSC, Middle Eastern students are being 
funded to pursue a higher education in China. In addition, Chinese universities started offering 
curriculums concerning the main languages of the Middle East: Arabic, Persian, Turkish, and Hebrew. 
Likewise, Middle Eastern universities offer Chinese teaching courses (Jinglie, 2010, pp. 30-31). To 
facilitate cultural exchange under the OBOR initiative, China created a scholarship program designed 
for students from the OBOR states to study in China (Xinjing, 2015). In 2012, the number of Arab 
students studying in China exceeded the 10,000 (Sawahel, 2016). As education was one of the topics in 
the 2016 policy paper, China considers it a principle for increasing cooperation in the future. China aims 
to strengthen cooperation on education by encouraging joint scientific research, increasing the number 
of government exchange scholarships, and the number of exchange students, which indicates that 
educational outreach will only increase in the near future (Ministry of Foreign Affairs , 2016).  
Subsequently, similar to the idea of the American University of Cairo and the British University in 
Egypt, the first Chinese university in the Middle East in being constructed; the Egyptian Chinese 
University. Furthermore, as mentioned in the policy paper, the development of the China-Jordan 
University is being promoted. However, it is questionable if the majority of the Arab exchange students 
are genuinely interested in the Chinese culture, as most Arab students are pursuing technical degrees, 
rather than engaging with the language and culture (Sawahel, 2016).  
5.2 Media 
As China aims to increase its reputation and image globally through (cultural) soft power, it has launched 
a campaign to internationalize its media foothold. As former President Hu Jintao stated: “the country 
will build a modern media system and enhance the power of news media for domestic and world service 
so as to create a favorable social environment and atmosphere for public opinion”. (Si, 2014, p. 6).  
These efforts try to enhance global understanding of China and the Chinese culture, but particularly aim 
to provide a counter narrative to the mainstream Western media by being the voice of the Chinese stance 
on global events (Si, 2014, p. 6). Among several other media agencies, the Chinese state-owned news 
agency Xinhua has been developed into an international news agency, publishing and broadcasting in 
over eight languages. By creating a news agency in Cairo, Xinhua expanded its reach to the Middle East 
by publishing and broadcasting in Arabic (Yang, 2015). Likewise, CCTV, now called the CGTN, China’s 
state television initiated broadcasting their news in Arabic in 2009. As the vice president of CGTN stated 
in 2009, “CCTV's Arabic International Channel will serve as an important bridge to strengthen 
communication and understanding between China and Arab countries.” (Anqi, 2009). In order for CGTN 
to not only broadcast in Arabic, but also have deeper integration in the society, it hires local 
correspondents and staff and provides training courses for journalists (Si, 2014, p. 6). Furthermore, 
China Today has also spread its Arabic version in the Middle East, informing its readers on global 
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events, China-related news, as well as China-related activities organized in the Middle East (Rakhmat, 
2017).  
Another important source of cultural soft power is the utilization of popular culture. Popular culture is 
the whole of mainstream ideas, perspectives, and norms which are fostered by mass media. This makes 
popular culture a power tool to quickly spread information and to potentially influence (political) 
thought and action (Fiske, 1989, p. 23). The U.S. has successfully been using popular culture to expand 
its global influence. In recent years, China has been eager to explore its own ways to expand its soft 
power in the Middle Eastern mass media. In 2015, one of China’s largest production organization called 
China Intercontinental Communication Center (CICC) closed a deal with the Abu Dhabi-based 
production company called Image Nation to set up a $10 billion strategic investment fund to form a 
foundation for a joint film industry. In November 2016, the CICC-Image Nation partnership expanded 
by creating a $300 million global film fund, the Culture China-Image Nation Content Fund, which 
should invest in the Chinese commercial film and television industry. As a result, the new factual 
entertainment channel Quest Arabia had been realized, which will air in twenty-two states in the Middle 
East in the Arabic language. Under the subtitle of USILK, a line-up has been made of a series of 
programs focused on the Silk Road region. It will particularly broadcast different China-centered 
documentary series which focus on different themes; China’s culture and society; rural China, 
biodiversity; the development of contemporary China and its new strategies in politics; economic; 
entertainments; environmental instability, and the various aspects of the Chinese culture. This media 
expansion indicates China’s willingness to diffuse Chinese popular culture to present itself as an 
upcoming “cultural superpower” (Rakhmat, 2017).  
That China is focusing on long term goals regarding its relationship with the Middle East becomes clear 
since China’s diffusion of soft power through popular culture is also focused on the youth in the Middle 
East. A twenty-six episodes long animation series called Kong Xiaoxi and Hakim, which will be 
broadcasted in both China and Saudi Arabia, as well as other Middle Eastern States, emphasizes China’s 
focus on cultural exchange. In an entertaining manner, the watcher is being introduced with the Chinese 
culture; cuisine, clothing, and martial arts. Likewise, the Chinese youth are informed on the Saudi 
Arabian culture, customs, and food. As the first season is focused on two Chinese teenagers who help 
Hakim and his father retain its restaurant, the announced second season will focus on Hakim visiting 
and learning martial arts in China (Ling, 2017).  
5.3 Arts 
Cultural exchange in the form of art exchange has always been an important component of China’s 
diplomacy with foreign states. Art is a crucial tool of cultural diplomacy as “it is a creative field which 
has the potential to bring people from two different cultures together, celebrating diversity and 
encouraging mutual understanding between people.” (Hurdicas, 2016). With the creation of several 
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cooperation platforms, like the CACF and the OBOR initiative, cultural exchanges have become 
institutionalized (Lirong, 2010, pp. 33-35). Every year, several art festivals are organized throughout 
the region as a product of these platforms. For example, in August 2016, under the frame of the CACF, 
the third ‘Chinese Art Festival’ was organized in Tunisia to strengthen cooperation between the two 
states over the long-term. The festival displayed the Chinese culture; traditional Chinese orchestral 
music, oral stunts, Kunqu Opera, Peking Opera, magic, and acrobatics. Moreover, an exhibition of 
cultural heritage in Beijing showcased kite making, dough figurine making, Chinese calligraphy, seal 
carving and paper cutting. (Hurdicas, 2016). Another manner in which the states are aiming to strengthen 
cooperation on culture is by the exchange of artists. Again as an initiative of the CACF, more than fifty 
Arabic artists have travelled to China in the past five years, to experience China’s nature, culture, and 
daily life. This multilateral exchange platform resulted in a showcase of a total of 40 pieces in the 
National Museum of China (National Art Museum of China, 2014). In China, fast-proliferating art 
museums are becoming increasingly more interested in Middle Eastern art. However, aside from the 
government-sponsored initiatives to enhance art exchanges, Middle Eastern art is rarely shown in 
China’s mainland. Nevertheless, engagements between the Middle East and China continue to 
proliferate (Movius, 2017).  
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6 Political soft power 
In light of China’s geo-economic strategy, its diplomatic efforts have increasingly been influential in 
recent years. This has brought along increased cooperation in other fields, such as cultural exchanges. 
Although the relationships between China and the Middle Eastern states have improved tremendously 
in the 21st century, China’s political role has remained moderate. Unlike Western states, which try to 
impose their political, e.g. democratic, values in a unilateral way, China intentionally does not interfere 
in other states’ internal affairs out of respect for their sovereignty, independence, traditions, and 
lifestyles. This non-interventionist policy contributes to China’s pragmatic stance towards the 
relationships it fosters with all states in the region, including regional rivals, since it believes that good 
relations contribute to better economic opportunities.  
As the world’s most turbulent region, the Middle East regional affairs have often influenced the rest of 
the world. As China sees the Middle East as an increasingly important market for energy and other 
regional exports, China aims to maintain good relationships with all major regional players, such as 
Egypt, Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. China’s lack of political baggage generates advantages for its role 
in the region. In the fear of losing this position, China has been wary to get involved in regional issues 
(Alterman & Garver, 2008, p. 79). For example, China was a strong supporter of the Palestinians during 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the 1980s and only recognized the Israeli state in 1992. Yet, as China 
recognized the importance of political neutrality on possible economic relations, the Chinese policy 
towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict moved towards the middle ground, resulting in a similar policy 
as the U.S. and the European Union (Signh, 2014, p. 10). However, recently China’s involvement in 
international diplomatic efforts in the region has slowly been increasing.  
6.1 Post-Arab Spring 
The so-called “Arab Spring” and the political transitions that several states witnessed caused China to 
redirect its dealing with the region, in which China needed some time to find its own position. As 
political Islamists took over power in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya, China was very willing to establish 
relations with the new political forces. In Egypt, President Morsi, as a member of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, reached out to China in order to reduce Egypt’s traditional reliance on the West. 
Continuing political instability, however, caused unexpected setbacks for China. For example, when the 
Morsi regime was removed in 2013, the newly signed deals with Egypt were destroyed. Although the 
new Egyptian government led by President al-Sisi deemed to be more Western focused than the prior 
regime, the relations between China and Egypt have become more fruitful ever since. China’s focus on 
economic matters rather than close involvement on political issues has enabled China to adopt quickly 
to the newly ruling political forces (Liu T. C., 2014, p. 4).  
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With the outbreak of the Syrian war, China ‘supported’ the al-Assad regime by continuously stressing 
its policy on non-interference in the UN Security Council (UNSC). Beijing’s actions were motivated by 
stating that a solution to the conflict should be sought through negotiations instead of force. During the 
Libya conflict in early 2011, China and Russia abstained from voting for Resolution 1973. This 
resolution imposed a no-fly zone and stated that necessary measures could be taken to protect the Libyan 
citizens from attacks by Qaddafi. Yet, according to Chinese allegations, Resolution 1973 had been 
exploited by the Western powers, resulting in the forceful overthrow of the Qaddafi regime. China’s 
support for al-Assad, has resulted in critical voices; Chinese citizens expressed their discontent with the 
support online, while developing states frequently condemned China’s choice. It also stiffened its 
relationship with states in the region, like the Gulf States. Yet, as the conflict carried on, China has 
expressed its reservations on the conflict, condemning the excessive use of force by the regime. In 
addition, China expressed several reservations on resolutions declared by the UNSC aiming at military 
intervention in Syria. With these reservations, China underlined the need for dialogue instead of the use 
of force. In addition, it contributed to safeguarding its own national interest by showing the political will 
to maintain good relations with all states in the region. Several efforts have been taken to enhance mutual 
dialogue between representatives of Beijing and the Syrian opposition, underlining China support for 
regime change as long as the format is acceptable to both sides, meaning through dialogue, in order to 
halt the bloodshed and stabilize the region (Evron, 2013, pp. 84-87) This shows that China to some 
extent played a role in influencing the region’s political arena. Nevertheless, to secure its national 
interest and friendship with all states, China remained in the background compared to the other powers 
involved in the Syrian conflict.  
6.2 Involvement in peace processes  
Although China is trying to dodge off playing a role in the region’s politics, it has been willing to act in 
situations where the benefits outweighed the costs. One of these cases has been the involvement in the 
South Sudan peace process. There where China typically calls for a peaceful resolution from afar, it took 
on an active role as leading mediator by funding, participating and providing assistance to the mediation 
process. China is by far the number one importer of South Sudan’s oil and China’s leading oil company, 
CNPC, is the largest foreign investor in the state’s oil sector. Besides the economic interest, some 
analysts have considered South Sudan as China’s ‘testing ground’ for a more proactive political 
involvement as part of becoming a responsible global actor (Verjee, 2016). China is also involved in the 
Afghan peace process, which aims to end the fifteen year long civil war. Peace in Afghanistan is not 
only important for China’s regional economic interest as Afghanistan is part of the OBOR initiative, it 
is also important for China’s national peace and security as it will prevent terrorist spillover to its own 
Muslim Uighur militancy (Chiue & Ferrie, 2016).  
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Over the years, China has shown some interest in participating in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. 
Establishing peace is according to Beijing crucial in creating stability, which is needed since Israel and 
Palestine are part of the OBOR initiative. On a request from Yasser Arafat in an attempt to get China 
more involved in the peace process and balance the west’s influence which tended to favor Israel, China 
appointed a special envoy on the conflict in 2002.  In the following years, China continuously expressed 
its support for an independent Palestine, as well as confirming Israel’s right to exist. In support for the 
continuation of the peace process, Chinese President Xi Jinping proposed a Four-Point peace plan in 
2013, when he invited President Abbas and Premier Netanyahu to Beijing in the same week; an action 
that shows China’s increasing involvement in the peace process. China’s Premier Li Keqiang stated: 
“As a friend of both Israel and the Palestinians, China has always maintained an objective and fair 
stance, and is willing to strive together with all sides to actively advance the Middle East peace process.” 
(Shai, 2014, p. 33). While the Palestinian side is welcoming the more proactive stance and is even 
requesting more Chinese involvement in the peace process, Netanyahu provides no clear position 
(Olimat, 2014, pp. 186-188). Yet, despite the envoy and the other initiatives, concrete input in the peace 
process has hardly been noticed. 
6.3 Nuclear deal Iran 
When in 2005 Iran announced the start of its uranium enrichment process, an international response 
quickly followed. During negotiations between the P5+1, the UNSC members and Germany, the calls 
for action were diverse; the European states and the U.S. argued for tough sanctions on the one hand, 
while on the other hand Russia and China opposed sanctions and were opting for negotiating with Iran. 
China and Iran have historically had close relations and while the Western states maintained a trade 
embargo on Iran, China enhanced its relationship with Iran by further enhancing their economic ties. 
Since Iran is an important link in the OBOR initiative and a large supplier of oil, China had immediate 
interest in closing a successful deal. However, all P5+1 states, including China and Russia, were opposed 
to Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons. Although China played a minor role during the negotiations, 
its role as arbiter between Iran and the U.S. was constructive to the negotiations. It played a pivotal 
diplomatic role in which it was careful to maintain close ties with Iran, while pressuring Iran to make 
concessions regarding its nuclear program. Simultaneously China urged the U.S. to accommodate Iran 
and to seek a concrete solution. On 14 July 2015, a nuclear deal with Iran was reached (Garver, 2016). 
6.4 China’s soft political power 
As many Chinese analysts have described the Middle East as “the graveyard of great powers”, China’s 
involvement in the region’s politics has been minor (Alterman and Garver 2008, 17). The geo-economic 
stance and the importance of remaining neutral have resulted in China’s enhancement of relations with 
all states in the region. This approach became clear during China’s presidential tour to the Middle East 
in 2016, as Xi Jinping did not only visited Saudi Arabia, but also Egypt, and Iran. The lack of 
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involvement in the Middle Eastern politics makes China a wanted player for mediation. Moreover, 
several states see China as a potential successor of American influence. Although China’s attitude is 
rather reserved, China increasingly takes on a more proactive posture in the major processes in the 
Middle East, which suggests that China is willing to slowly but surely use its soft power to influence 
political outcomes.  
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7 Military soft power 
As China is dedicated to increasing its influence by soft power means, it has not established any 
permanent (hard) military presence in the region. This is different from other states that have established 
permanent bases throughout the region, particularly the U.S. This could be explained by their focus on 
geopolitics, rather than geo-economics; their national interest is more connected to concerns that could 
threaten the national security. China’s primary concern, however, is protecting its global economic 
interests. Therefore, China is not interested in getting involved in regional conflict in which it might 
damage relationships with the engaged parties. Besides the need to protect its foreign commercial 
investments and interest, its concerns are also related to the large group of Chinese expatriates in the 
region. This and China’s geo-economic strategy have occasionally led to temporary Chinese deployment 
of soft military in the Middle East. This focus on solely soft military power in the region contributes to 
the peaceful rise to power narrative. Moreover, China’s contribution to international peace and security 
generates a positive image.  
Unlike hard military power, soft military power is characterized by a temporary deployment of armed 
forces without having extraterritorial privileges, nor institutionalized military arrangements. Rather, the 
military is being used for specific missions, both military and civilian. These missions should not only 
benefit the foreign state, but also the host state’s population as is the case with humanitarian relief, 
protection, peacekeeping, and conflict prevention. Moreover, it can also entail buildings, such as joint 
intelligence facilities, military replenishment stops and technical stops, maintenance bases, and military 
teaching institutions (Sun D. , 2015). 
7.1 China’s missions 
In order for China not to get involved in regional conflicts, it deploys its soft power military missions 
under the banner of international missions that promote peace and development and benefit the whole 
international community. Piracy in the Gulf of Aden and around the Somali waters has posed an 
international problem on maritime transport. For China, as a world economic power, the Gulf of Aden 
is important for the access it provides to the Suez Canal, an important gateway to Europe. The 
importance of this gateway will increase further because of its role in the OBOR initiative. Since 2009, 
the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) escort fleets are active in the counter-piracy mission. This 
mission has increased China’s soft military presence as the PLAN fleet visit several states in the region, 
like Oman and Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, the mission in the Gulf of Aden has directly influenced the 
installation of several temporary PLAN technical service stops in the region. In the ports of Aden, 
Djibouti, Jeddah, and Salalah, fuel and material resupplying stops have been established while other 
stops allow the PLAN to completely recharge, to rest weaponry, and to repair the ships (Sun D. , 2015). 
China also uses its military capabilities in a soft manner by contributing to UN peacekeeping missions. 
Currently, these forces consist of 1,721 personnel which are active in Lebanon, the Western Sahara, 
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South-Sudan, Darfur, and around the borders between Israel and its neighbors (UN, 2017, p. 9). Within 
the volatile region, the growing number of Chinese expatriates are continuously exposed to security 
risks. On February 25, 2011, China deployed the PLAN to support and protect the evacuation of Chinese 
citizens from Libya. Within a week all 35,860 Chinese citizens, as well as 2100 foreign nationals, were 
evacuated in what is now known as China’s largest noncombatant evacuation operation (Collins and 
Erickson 2011). Likewise, China evacuated Chinese and foreign nationals from Yemen in 2015 on 
request from several foreign governments (Rajagopalan, 2015). Moreover, the PLAN had an active role 
in the international convoy that removed the chemical weapon arsenal from Syria in 2014. During this 
joint mission from the UN and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, a Chinese 
missile frigate escorted the vessel that transported the chemical weapons from the port of Lattakia 
(OPCW, 2014).  
7.2 Soft military power 
Peace and security in the Middle East are of increasing importance for China. China’s soft military 
activities in the region have become an important tool to safeguard its own economic interest, protect 
Chinese workers in the region, and to generate soft power. As contributor to international missions, 
China is placing itself in a favorable light internationally and domestically, thereby expanding its global 
influence. Its involvement in international peacekeeping efforts also provides China with a venue to 
increasingly influence and shape global norms, and demonstrates China’s commitment to a peaceful rise 
to global power status, rather than forming a threat (Wang B. Y., 2013). Moreover, its gradual 
involvement in the Middle East aligns with China’s broader strategy for the region; the enhancement of 
its relationships with all states in the Middle East, which could contribute to more economic 
opportunities, as well as more influence in the region.  
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8 Opportunities and challenges 
Throughout the analysis of this thesis, it has become clear that China’s position, which it solely attained 
through soft power initiatives, in the Middle East has rapidly increased. China’s increasing focus on the 
deepening of ties and increasing involvement in the region has demonstrated its commitment to the 
region. These strong ties between China and the region provide a lot of space for future opportunities. 
Yet, juxtapose opportunities, the dynamic region also presents a lot of possible challenges for China.  
8.1 Economic development 
Whereas China once primarily engaged with the region from its ideological driven foreign policy, it is 
now mainly driven by energy and commercial interests. The Middle Eastern states are amongst the 
developing states and will open doors to many investment opportunities for China. As China’s economy 
will continue to grow, the demand for energy sources will continuously give new incentives to China to 
increase its presence within the region’s energy sector, as well as remaining an important trading partner. 
Likewise, the focus on renewable energy by both sides in their aim to diversify their energy sources 
places China in a favorable position, as China is one of the world’s leading countries in renewable 
energy. Moreover, the region’s significant role in the OBOR initiative stimulates the long term economic 
commitment between China and the region, facilitating important opportunities for cooperation, like the 
recent construction of necessary infrastructure. Following the Arab uprisings in 2011, the Middle East 
has been in the process of radical restructuring. Regional instability often is followed by lower economic 
activity and foreign direct investments, as most multinationals and states are reluctant to invest. China, 
however, often grabs the opportunity to gain a foothold in the post-crisis states. As the region is currently 
facing multiple crises, the reconstruction of those states will offer China lots of opportunities (Lahrichi, 
2013). 
8.2 The need for stability 
Although China utilizes the opportunities of instability, it would much more benefit from a stable and 
peaceful Middle East. As China’s position in the region is expanding, the expectation of China’s ability 
and willingness to play a stabilizing role in regional political and security affairs is also growing. China’s 
sole focus on trade and economic benefits and its limited involvement in politics is increasingly leading 
to criticism (Andersen, Jiang and Sorensen 2015, 7). Subsequently, Beijing has selectively been more 
active in the region’s political realm by providing conflict mediation. The opportunity of playing a 
bigger role in politics could attribute to China’s image as ‘responsible great power’. Moreover, 
increasing political involvement could also enhance China’s influence in the region. Yet, at the same 
time, it could pose serious challenges for China. Greater political involvement could jeopardize China’s 
status in the region as it could possibly endanger its neutral stance. Being no longer ‘everyone’s friend’, 
but rather picking sides during crises could result in the worsening of bilateral relations. This could 
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negatively affect China’s economic objectives in the region, while these objectives are key to China. In 
addition, China could get caught up in regional conflicts, something that has happened with all other 
great powers in the Middle East. This could seriously harm the state’s reputation, as has been the case 
for the U.S. following the war on terror.  
China’s role in the security of the region has been minor. Yet, as the soft military presence is increasing, 
the non-interference policy is shifting towards a policy which is more inclined to engage militarily in 
the region. Although China remains committed to their soft power strategy to rise to power, several 
signs could indicate that China is opening the door for future hard power projects in the region. For 
instance, China signed a new counter-terrorism law in 2015 that, for the first time, legalizes the sending 
of Chinese troops for combat abroad without a UN mandate. Moreover, in 2016, China initiated the 
construction of its first overseas naval base in Djibouti. With a strategic location close to the Middle 
East, the base could contribute to a more active role in ensuring peace and stability at the regional and 
global level, something that is crucial to the success of the extensive OBOR initiative (Ghiselli, 2016). 
Yet, China’s reserved stance to actual hard power within the region itself displays the earlier mentioned 
challenges a bigger involvement in the region’s security could form. Moreover, it endangers China’s 
commitment to its soft power strategy.  
8.3 Terrorism  
Terrorism poses a severe threat to China’s interest in the region. Assuring peace in the Middle East will 
also contribute to domestic stability and peace. One of the growing challenges China is facing, is the 
rise of Islamist terrorism. The deepening of the relations with the Middle East increasingly has exposed 
Chinese people to radical Islamic thoughts. Particularly cultural exchange has led to the increasing 
familiarity with Islam (Borton, 2016). Consequently, the Middle East conflicts have attracted Chinese 
jihadists. ISIS even released its propaganda in Mandarin Chinese-language and Uighur. It is estimated 
that more than hundred Uighurs from the Xinjiang province have joined ISIS, making it the third largest 
nationality of foreign fighters (Gramer, 2017). China has been vocal in various anti-terrorism campaigns. 
In order to combat this global problem, opportunity arises in counterterrorism cooperation between 
China and the U.S., the two foreign great powers in the region (Alterman and Garver 2008, 131). 
8.4 The U.S.: conflict or cooperation 
The rising importance of China in the Middle East has increasingly formed competition for the 
traditionally primary external power in the Middle East; the U.S. Following the recent reduction of 
America’s reliance on Middle Eastern oil, its involvement in the region has declined. Moreover, as the 
U.S. has increasingly become unpopular in the Middle East, many states consider China an alternative 
strategic partner able to counter America’s influence in the region. America’s foreign policy is mainly 
causing an anti-America stance in the region. Particularly America’s role in the war on terror and its 
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support for Israel has resulted into fierce criticisms. These and more American actions in the region have 
skillfully been criticized by China, which thereby tries to enhance its own image as the region’s friend 
(Zambelis and Gentry 2008, 63-65). Against the backdrop of these developments in America’s foreign 
policy, China’s influence in the region is rising. Although the region’s dynamics are increasingly 
changing, it is unlikely that this competition will develop into direct confrontations. Yet, the challenge 
remains to maintain a stabilized competition in the region (Salman, Geeraerts& Pieper 2015, 115).  
 Besides that China’s entry poses new challenges for America’s position in the Middle East, there are 
also several avenues for possible cooperation to advance shared interests. Strategic cooperation between 
China and the U.S. could help the Middle East move away from crises and conflict and towards 
becoming a prosperous region that connects the major regions globally. For instance by shared 
assessments to enhance understanding and improve political solutions to regional problems, intelligence 
sharing, and joint development assistance. This stability is also necessary for their complementary 
interests; unprecedented economic connectivity and trade through Asia and the Middle East, and energy 
security, on which they could cooperate to secure a stable flow of oil and a stable price (deLeon and 
Jiemian 2015). So far, China has not been seeking to confront the U.S. in the Middle East. Chinese 
interests have rather benefited from America’s security protection in the region. Each party, China, the 
U.S., and the Middle East, should recognize the common interest and promote cooperation. Noteworthy, 
the first cooperation initiatives have successfully been established. Examples are the trilateral 
cooperation between both states and Afghanistan in the areas of counter-terrorism efforts and peace 
talks, as well as cooperation for the counter-piracy effort in the Gulf of Aden (Bin, 2017). Yet, increasing 
cooperation will remain a challenge as long as the U.S. eyes China’s rise in the region with suspicion 
and remains protective over its own role in the region, as well as China’s hesitant attitude towards more 
involvement.  
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9 Conclusion 
9.1 Conclusion research questions 
This thesis has aimed to investigate China’s soft power deployment in the Middle East and to provide 
an answer to the question what China’s foreign policy key objectives are in the Middle East, and how 
China is using a soft power strategy to gain influence in the Middle East. In order to answer these 
questions, an assessment has been made through the analysis of the four key soft power forms, 
economic, cultural, political and military soft power. 
Since the 1980s, China has been opening up to the rest of the world by integrating its economy in the 
capitalistic world economy. With an average annual growth of the real GDP of almost ten percent 
between 1989 and 2016, China transformed into a major global trade and economic power. With the 
turn of the century, the Beijing leadership realized that a strategy was needed to reduce other 
governments’ discomfort with China’s rise and to bring about a successful Chinese rejuvenation to great 
power status. This led to the adoption of a Chinese soft power strategy that has enabled China to 
peacefully increase its global influence. China generally approaches the international arena from its geo-
economic interests, giving priority to the establishment of strong economic ties with foreign 
governments. From this perspective, the Middle East has become an interesting region for China in 
recent years given the region’s rich energy sources and its increasing economic importance. With 
initiating an Arab policy paper and the establishment of several platforms like the CACF and the OBOR 
initiative, China’s intention for long-term relationships with the region is declared. 
As became clear in chapter three, China’s economic diplomacy has been utilized as an important 
diplomatic tool for the generation of soft power and the development of “win-win” relations that have 
enhanced economic activity in the Middle East. As China’s economic growth has mainly been fueled 
by purchased Middle Eastern oil, ensuring permanent access to the region’s energy sources is therefore 
a key objective for China. Moreover, China’s expertise on renewable energy technology places Beijing 
in a favorable position, as the majority of the Middle Eastern states are focusing on renewable energy. 
Through construction of, and large investments in construction projects for the development of 
infrastructure, the energy industry, and joint cooperation platforms such as OBOR, China managed to 
contribute to economic development of Middle Eastern states on the one hand and to strengthen its 
position in the region on the other hand. Moreover, the visibility that China generates from ‘Made in 
China’ manufacturing goods contribute to a positive image in the Middle East. China’s ‘business-first’ 
approach including the deepening of economic ties through cooperation and joint investments have been 
a key strategy of China to empower its soft power in the region. 
In chapter four, it became evident that culture is also of major importance in China’s soft power strategy. 
It is particularly aimed to portray its global prestige and national strength (image-building) in order to 
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deepen ties with the region. One of the most prominent tools of cultural soft power is cooperation in the 
field of education, through educational exchange programs, the foundation of Confucius institutes, and 
the construction of Chinese universities within the Middle East, which try to disseminate Chinese 
language and the rich culture. The spread of China’s domestic media in the region, by adopting regional 
languages such as Arabic and Farsi, has been another prominent tool to further propagate Chinese soft 
power. Furthermore, entertainment has been used to further improve China’s image in the Middle East, 
especially through the media industry and the utility of art.   
As China is reliant for more than fifty percent of its energy supply on Middle Eastern energy sources, 
the region remains of vital importance for China’s economy. Nevertheless, regional instability poses 
great risks on this economic focused strategy of soft power. Especially during the last decade several 
political upheavals and conflicts have erupted in the region, which have pushed China to distance itself 
from its traditional ‘business first’ approach of soft power to ensure its position in the region. 
China has traditionally adhered to a non-interference principle that prevents China to meddle in other 
states’ internal affairs. This policy has enabled China to remain neutral during regional political tensions 
and to remain friendly with all Middle Eastern states. It likewise conforms to its ‘business first’ approach 
in the Middle East, since this political neutrality prevents China to put at risk good economic ties. 
Nevertheless, China recently seems to gradually become more pro-active and willing to use its soft 
power to fulfill its share in the Middle Eastern political affairs. Several examples in this thesis have 
underlined this, including China’s role in establishing a dialogue with both the Syrian opposition and 
the al-Assad regime, its increasing involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and China’s 
role as arbiter in the Iran nuclear deal. Moreover, China has adopted a leading role as mediator in the 
South-Sudan peace process as it perceived more advantages than drawbacks, particularly in protecting 
its economic interest. Likewise, its involvement in the Afghan peace process is motivated by the 
economic prospects of Afghanistan in the OBOR initiative as well as to prevent terrorist spillover into 
China. This gradual shift from non-interference to limited interference could indicate that China’s 
diplomatic skills are becoming more sophisticated and that it is increasingly aware of the fact that a 
different approach to soft power strategy is necessary to safeguard its influence in the Middle East and 
hence to reach great power status. Through its proposals and mediation, China has found a way to be 
more assertive in the political arena while refraining from taking a politically exposed position.  
With regards to military soft power, China distinguishes itself from other states, particularly the U.S., 
with the absence of Chinese hard power in the direct region. China’s soft military missions in the Middle 
East have not only contributed to safeguarding Chinese economic interests and Chinese expatriates, they 
have also contributed to positive image building efforts, which in turn have boosted China’s soft power. 
This positive image is mainly the result of the nature of these missions, as their main objective it to 
maintain global and regional peace and security. Par example, China’s contributions to the counter-
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piracy mission, several peacekeeping missions, the evacuation of expatriates from the region, as well as 
the removal of the chemical weapon arsenal from Syria in 2014, places China in a favorable light in the 
region and thus further enhance its soft power.  
Throughout this thesis' in-depth analysis of China's soft power strategy in the Middle East, it has become 
clear that China’s influence in the Middle East is rapidly increasing through a variety of soft power 
initiatives that focus on the enhancement of its relations with the region. China’s key objectives for its 
pivot towards the Middle East are energy security and economic interests. Even though China's soft 
power is traditionally met through its ‘business-first’ approach and hence through a soft power strategy 
mainly focusing on economy and culture, and to a lesser extent focusing on relatively political and 
military neutrality, the outcome of this analysis has depicted that, in case of the Middle East, political 
and military soft power strategies have taken a larger focus in recent years. It has shown that China’s 
gradual shift from non-interference to limited interference in favor of the region enhances its soft power, 
as it becomes gradually more proactive in the political and security field. As the Middle East is 
considered a key global crossroads and the largest provider of energy sources, China is committed to 
maintain and improve its image in the Middle East, not only by further integrating in the Middle East 
economically and culturally through cooperation platforms like the OBOR initiative, but also through 
gradually increasing commitment to neutral political involvement, peacekeeping and security efforts in 
the region.  
9.2 Limitations 
As this research successfully described China’s soft power strategy, limitations are bound to the extent 
of data-selection and the initiatives that have been highlighted in this thesis. This limited data selection, 
however, can be extended by including other initiatives. As sources are lacking that indicate how the 
Middle East perceives China’s soft power strategy, it remains rather unclear to what extent China’s soft 
power strategy is translated in real influence. Government documents provide some insight, but the 
perception of the Middle Eastern population which polls China’s soft power according to the definition 
used in this thesis is non-existent. With the help of questionnaires, the perception of the population could 
be measured. Moreover, as China’s soft power strategy is a relatively new strategy that China is 
deploying for ten years, it is unclear how it will develop in the future. As chapter seven indicates, China 
has a lot of potential opportunities, as well as challenges, which could upgrade, as well as downgrade 
China’s influence. Further research on China’s soft power strategy is therefore needed in the future in 
order to shed light on these new developments in the upcoming years.  
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